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1. Introduction 
Many decision-making problems involve making choices with incomplete information. 
Models of decision-making under conditions of risk are well established in the decision 
theory literature. In these models, risk and return (payoffs) are specified in terms of 
numerical estimates, and4the goal is t o  make a decision that  maximizes some expected 
value. In addition, new information can be combined using a decision rule (such as 
Bayes' rule) for deriving revised estimates of risk. 
There are several problems, however, where quantifiable risk estimates are difficult t o  
obtain. In these problems, the decision-maker might have t o  perform a significant 
amount of problem solving if asked t o  provide a numerical estimate of risk associated 
with a proposition or a state of nature, and even then, attach qualifying comments t o  
the numerical estimate (Dhar and Pople, 1987). In this paper we describe one such 
problem, where the concept of risk is difficult to  conceptualize in terms of quantitative 
estimates and hence inappropriate t o  manipulate in terms of standard belief calculi. 
Specifically, we focus on the problem of an auditor faced with the task of assessing the 
likelihood that  a client's financial statements will contain material errors. Especially for 
large accounts, it is important that the auditor be confident that  the risk of making an  
erroneous decision is low. Given the increased competitiveness of the auditing 
profession, however, the auditor is limited from a pragmatic standpoint in terms of time 
and other resources that  can be assigned t o  each client. Good planning is therefore 
essential for an efficient audit; before beginning the actual process of information 
gathering and substantive testing, the  auditor must have expectations about specific 
general ledger accounts that might be particular risky in a specific case, and plan tests 
accordingly. 
We have studied audit planning in two "big eighttt accounting firms over the last two 
years. We have come to  recognize the process of risk assessment as a complex one that  
involves understanding the effects of a variety of economic and organization-specific 
factors on accounts. We characterize the problem of risk assessment as knowledge based, 
where knowledge about the client's history, recent events specific to  a firm or industry, 
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and knowledge about the internals of a firm are crucial in shaping the auditor's 
judgement about risks associated with accounts, and hence the audit plan. 
There is currently much interest in developing knowledge based support systems to  
support audit planning. Accounting firms are interested in developing systematic 
methods for risk assessment and audit planning. They feel that knowledge based 
systems can help in this respect. Secondly, accounting firms are concerned with the loss 
of knowledge about a client when an auditor leaves the audit team. By preserving the 
results of past experiences with auditing a client, knowledge based systems might also 
help educate new members of an  audit team. We have concerned ourselves with the first 
of these objectives by trying t o  understand and model the process of risk assessment. 
Once the details of this process is understood, i t  should provide a sound basis for 
designing intelligent support systems. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we define 
more precisely the different types of risks associated with auditing, and which of these 
we are interested in modeling. We also make certain assertions about how auditors 
assess risk. The assertions are based on empirical observations of the audit planning 
process (tape recordings of actual audit planning meetings as well as interviews). In 
section three we describe the knowledge based model of audit risk, focusing on the 
knowledge representation employed in a system designed to  assess a certain component 
of audit risk called inherent risk. We conclude with auditors' reactions about the 
inadequacies of this system and the types of information that needs t o  be gathered and 
modeled in order to  overcome these limitations. 
2, Risks in Auditing 
The problem confronting an auditor is referred to in the accounting literature as one 
of a ~ i d i t  risk assessment. Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) provide a detailed discussion 
of the historical development of a model of audit risk, a review of the literature dealing 
with the appropriateness of the model and a discussion of the problems that auditors 
might encounter in trying to  implement it. The majority of this literature has focused 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87- 116 
on the AICPA's audit risk model as presented in SAS 47: 
Audit risk = Inherent risk * Control risk *Detection risk 
Inherent Risk is the susceptibility of an account balance or class of account balances 
4 
to  error that  could be material, assuming that there are no related internal accounting 
controls. Control Risk is the risk that this error in the account balance will not be 
caught by the client's internal control system. Detection risk is the risk that any error 
not detected by the control system will not be detected by the audit procedures, thereby 
affecting final financial statement balances. The AICPA emphasizes that the above 
model of audit risk is a purely conceptual one, and says little about whether or how its 
various components can be measured. 
According to  the AICPA, the risk assessment process should occur during audit 
planning. Auditors should determine an acceptable level for audit risk, assess the levels 
of inherent risk and control risk and then determine the level of detection risk based on 
these assessments. Auditors should assess the inherent riskiness of specific accounts by 
reviewing a variety of factors that are specific to the client, the client's industry or the 
economy in general, and by determining the impact of these factors on individual 
accounts. This can help determine the nature, timing and extent of tests of the client's 
internal control systems (AICPA, 1985). 
The professional literature also provides lists of factors that should be considered in 
assessing inherent risk. Peat Marwick's (1985) audit manual, for example, presents a 
representative list: 
1. Monetary amount associated with the account 
2. Susceptibility of asset t o  theft 
3. Complexity required to  determine amounts to  be entered in the account 
4. Degree of management judgment involved in valuing the account 
5. Degree to which external events affect values in the account 
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6. Past history of error 
7. Degree to  which client's financial condition motivates management to 
misstate the amount in the account 
8. Experience of the personnel performing accounting functions involving the 
account 
While the abovementioned model of audit risk and the list of factors provide a 
conceptual foundation for understanding the role of inherent risk, they do not indicate 
how experienced auditors actually use the above factors in conjunction with industry 
and client-specific knowledge in order to  form inherent risk judgements. Our central 
objective in this research has been to explicate this model and make use of it in building 
a system that  can be used to  assess inherent risk. In this model, inherent risk is not 
computed as a numerical estimate for each account. Rather, risk at  the account level is 
expressed in the form of potential reasons or hypotheses which are a by-product of a 
more general reasoning process involving analysis of financial statements and client and 
industry factors as a whole. In other words, financial statements are analyzed in the 
context of industry and client-specific data; this analysis results in potential reasons 
indicating why there could be errors in specific accounts, without quantified estimates of 
error. These potential reasons or hypotheses help to  target the auditor's evidence 
gathering in subsequent phases of the audit. The following quote from an experienced 
auditor provides a succinct description of the information gathering process: 
I think the process you go through to obtain that knowledge really is to 
gain an understanding of the client's business, an understanding of the 
client, an understanding of how the fluctuations i n  the economy might 
affect a client's business. You compare the client's business to other 
businesses in the same industry to see i f  they are having consistent 
operating results and i f  not, i f  there are logical reasons for it; i f  they are 
having consistent operating results, i s  that what you expected? I mean, you 
develop expectations i n  your mind of what you expect to see and, to the 
extent results don't conform to that yet, you begin asking questions to obtain 
the necessary knowledge. 
In the remainder of this section we provide a general description of the process of 
Inherent Risk assessment before describing the details of the model. For descriptive 
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empirical studies of the various types of risks, the reader is referred to Gibbins and 
Wolf (1982), Jiambalvo and Waller (1984), Libby et.al (1985), and Boritz et.al (1986). 
2.1. Inherent Risk Assessment 
Based on the results of o,ur two year field research project (more completely described 
in Peters, et. a]., 1987), we characterize the approach toward assessing the inherent risk 
of material error in a given general ledger account balance as one involving differential 
analysis. The analysis is essentially change driven in that specific changes (external or 
internal) generate change expectations in accounts. 
In our model, the inherent risk evaluation process begins by generating expectations 
for accounts balances. Specifically, the auditor identifies changes that have occurred in 
the firm or its environment and determines how those changes should interact with 
historic trends to  produce an expected balance in the account. In order to do this, the 
auditor uses an understanding of the relationships between firmlenvironmental factors 
and general ledger accounts. By making use of these relationships, the auditor develops 
expectations on how the observed changes should affect the balances in a given account. 
For accounts where actual balances that are outside the expected range, the auditor 
first reviews factors that might create or affect management incentives to misstate the 
account balances (e.g. the existence of a compensation plan keyed to  reported earnings). 
At the same time, the auditor considers factors that might impact on the likelihood that  
management could or would misstate that particular account balance (because of the 
degree of judgment allowed in the determination of account balances). The auditor also 
considers the complexity of the transactions or accounting for a particular account since 
such factors might also be responsible for deviations from expected balances. Based on 
this analysis, the auditor decides if additional evidence will be needed to determine 
whether the difference between the expected balance and the actual balance was due to 
an error in the expectation generating process, a legitimate response by management to  
a change in the environment, a questionable response by management or an 
unintentional error, 
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Below, we list five assertions that characterize the process of Inherent Risk 
determination described above. In the following section, we describe in detail, how we 
model the various knowledge components referenced in the assertions. 
Assertion 1: Auditors generate expectations concerning account balances and 
4 
investigate balances that differ from these expectations. 
Assertion 2: Auditors generate expectations about accounts based on changes in 
events or circumstances relative to  prior years. 
Assertion 3: Management's incentives and abilities to  manipulate account balances 
affect assessment of inherent risk. 
Assertion 4: Inherent risk assessments are generated on an account by account basis. 
Assertion 5: To be useful, inherent risk assessments should provide an explanation of 
why a given account is risky rather than merely a quantitative estimate of risk. 
3. Knowledge Representation 
Figure 1 shows the general process of inherent risk assessment described above. First, 
expected values of general ledger accounts are generated. The data inputs to this 
process are historical data and changes in conditions (external and internal) from last 
year. The output of the first stage, namely expected account balances, are then 
compared with the actual general ledger data for the period being audited. A 
materiality judgement is incorporated in this stage. The output of the second stage is a 
list of accounts where expectations are not in line with reality. The third stage involves 
determining whether some of management's incentives or constraints might have caused 
it to  take actions that account for the differences between observed and expected values 
of accounts. The fourth stage involves making a judgement on management's "track 
record" (their ability and inclination) for manipulating accounts. FinaIIy, auditors 
indicated that the complexity associated with computing account balances (i.e. "LIFO is 
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more complex than FIFO for valuing inventory") also affect inherent risk. We refer t o  
these as mmechanical" account specific factors. 
In summary, the five main processes are expectation generation, evidence checking, 
incentive checking, judging management's track record, and evaluation of the 
L 
mechanical complexity associated with each account. These comprise the overall control 
structure of the system as shown in figure 1. In our existing system, we have not 
focused on modeling the last two processes. We shall comment on the consequences of 
these missing components in the next section. In the remainder of this section, we 
discuss the first three processes, introducing with each, the knowledge used in each 
process and how it is represented. 
3.1. Expectation Generation 
Auditors generally have what we term "base expectations" for a client's accounts. 
These base expectations result from observations about the client. For example, the 
auditor might expect that the client's market share this year should have fallen by 5% 
because a major customer was acquired by a competitor in a vertical merger. For our 
model, the relevant input is a quantitative one, accompanied by a descriptive 
explanation of the reason for the quantitative input. Specifically, an input is a three 
tuple of the form 
<firm factor, percent change, comment > 
where the firm factor is a general ledger account or an economic factor (for example, 
market demand) that  influences a general ledger account, followed by its percent 
change, and a comment that  denotes the reason for the change. The comment, which is 
the reason for the base expectation is only for the user's benefit. 
In order t o  assess the impacts of these changes on specific accounts, the system makes 
use of what has been termed by us and previously by Bouwman (1983) as an "internal 
model of the firm". This model consists of three types of firm factors, namely, general 
ledger accounts, financial statement totals or  sub-totals, and exogenous factors (such as 
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I Observed changes I I Historical firm data I 
I Develop expected values for I 
I general ledger accounts I 
............................... 
I 
v 
I Compare expected values to I<--------- I Current year's general 1 
I actual I I ledger data 
............................... 
I 
.......................... 
I 
V (The enclosed processes are potentially concurrent) 
................................................................... 
I I .................................. I I 
I I Determine potential management I ------------------- I 
I I motives for misstatement based I<------- I Incentives I I 
I I on constraints I ------------------- I 
I I Evaluate degree of flexibility I I Historic evaluation of I I  
I I management might have to !<--I management and control I I 
I I misstate account I I environment I I 
I I Evaluate potential degree of I 
I I error due to mechanical, account1 
I I specific factors I 
I Review evidence, identify accounts I 
I that may have higher risk and I 
I present reasons for riskiness I 
Figure 1 
The Process of Inherent Risk Assessment 
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market demand). These factors are related through algebraic equations. In effect, the 
internal model of the firm is comprised of a node-link structure, with nodes being the 
arithmetic operators involved in the equations, and links representing the three types of 
firm factors involved in these algebraic equations. Figure 2 shows a graphical 
representation of a segment of the internal model of the firm. 
4 
Nodes and links are represented as structured objects. The operator object has three 
slots, namely, operator, inputs, and output. This object type also has two types of 
functions associated with it that  perform computation (in object oriented language, 
these functions are called methods). The first type are for computing an output value 
(in absolute or  percentage terms) from inputs. The second type compute qualitative 
directional change in the output given a qualitative change in only one of the inputs. 
The usefulness of both types of methods will become apparent shortly. 
The firm factor object has slots that contain the following information: type of node 
(whether i t  represents a general ledger account or not), historic value, current value, 
change value, pointers to  operator objects that compute the current value of the firm 
factor, and expectation values (generated as a consequences of changes of other firm 
nodes' values) which are posted for further analysis. There can be several ways of 
computing the value of a firm factor. 
A base expectation is indexed to the internal model by its first component, which is a 
pointer to  a firm factor object. When a base expectation is entered as a change, i t  
specifies a change in the firm factor object t o  which it points, which in turn causes the 
operator objects that  compute its value to  recompute their output values. This 
procedure is carried out recursively until all changes have been propagated through the 
network. The end result of the propagation is that each general ledger account object's 
expectation slot consists of a list of expectations for that  account -- each of these 
generated using a particular formula.' 
'since an account can be computed in several ways, the values could be in opposite directions and 
hence cancel out. We preserve all values since they contain information that  would be lost in adding them 
UP- 
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(current-ratio 
type: other 
input-to : 
output-of : * 
historical-value: 3000 
current-value: 3500 
change-value : .05 
expectation-values: nil 
{current-liabilities 
n-ledger-total ) 
input- to : .--" 
output-of: 
historical-value: 
current-value: 2.5m current-value: 
change-value: .25 change-value: 
expectation-values' 
3 
*{accounts-receivable 
type: gen-ledger-account 
input-to: , 
output-of:* output-of : 
historical-value: am historical-value: Im 
current-value: fm current-value: 1.5m 
change-value : 0 change-value: .5 
expectation-values: nil expectation-values: nil 
3 3 
Figure S 
A Segment of the internaI model of the firm 
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3.2. Evidence Checking 
The second stage is a straightforward one. The percentage value change in the 
expectation is checked against the actual change computed from the general ledger data. 
A material difference exists if the difference exceeds a pre-set range. Expectations that  
are not materially differenbfrom actuals are excluded from further consideration, while 
the remainder are put into a Hflagged accounts list". This latter set also includes 
accounts for which no expectations were generated by the system but for which material 
changes have occurred. 
3.3. Incentive Checking 
Determining discrepancies is only part of the overall auditing process. It is equally 
imiortant t o  understand the reasons for the discrepancies. This problem is one of 
determining whether and how management discretion might have been exercised with 
respect to  these accounts. To do this, it is necessary to know management's 
motivations and how these motivations affect specific accounts. 
We refer to  motivational factors as incentives, which are represented as constraints. 
An incentive can represent either a restriction placed on account balances as part of a 
contract (e.g. bond covenants), contractual arrangements that tie management's 
compensation to  levels in account balances, or expectations by outsiders concerning 
levels of account balances (e.g, public expectations of steadily growing earnings). 
Examples of incentives might include a management bonus plan that provides 
additional compensation if gross profit exceeds 110% of last year's, or a bond covenant 
that requires the current ratio to be greater than 2. 
Incentives are represented as constraints consisting of any relational operator (except 
equality) with two arguments. The arguments can be constants or functions that return 
values of firm factor nodes. At least one of the arguments must be of the latter type. In 
effect, incentives are indexed to the internal model of the firm via these constraints. To 
illustrate, the second incentive listed above would be represented in prefix Lisp-like 
notation as 
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where cvalue is a function that  returns the current value of the current-ratio object. 
The  default assumption used by the system is that account balances have been 
influenced by the incentives: The problem is t o  determine how the manipulations might 
have occurred. Given the structure of the internal model of the firm, it is clear that  
there are an  infinite number of ways of manipulating an account because of the infinite 
number of combinations of values of its inputs that can produce a certain output. The 
problem is therefore one of limiting this search so that  only relevant combinations are 
considered. 
The incentive checking process proceeds as follows. For each constraint, a --teriality 
computation is applied in the same way as for general ledger accounts. il :. . qenote the 
actual value of the object referenced in the constraint as A, the expecttd LLS E, and the 
relational operator in the constraint as R, then for a constraint of the form "(R argl  
arg2)" , the following decision rules are applied: 
Incentive Rule 1: 
If A = E  
then if R is of type ">" or la>=" 
then management have been motivated to increase argl 
(or decrease arg2j 
else management have been motivated to decrease argl 
(or increase arg2) 
The rationale for this rule is that A has been manipulated to be equal to  E. 
Incentive Rule 2: 
If A <> E 
then if R is of type "<" or *a<=" 
then management have been motivated to decrease argl 
(or decrease arg2) 
else management have been motivated to increase argl 
(or increase arg2) 
The logic embedded in this rule is that when there is a significant difference between 
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the actual and expected values, the difference stems from management having either 
given up the  constraint as not achievable and hence shifting accounts values so that  
they may be favorable for the following period, or management having satisfied the 
constraint by  a large enough margin and hence shifting account values (in a direction . 
opposite t o  the operator) In order to  position the firm more favorably for the following 
period without compromising this year's objective. In effect, the rule incorporates a 
"shifting logic" that might be used by management in order to  plan for subsequent 
periods. 
Applying the decision rules above results in a hypothesis of the form: 
Account i has  been increased. 
To investigate this hypothesis, the system sets up the goal: 
Determine how account i has  been increased. 
This involves a search beginning a t  object i in the firm model, determining ways in 
which i can be increased. As we pointed out above, there can be numerous 
combinations by which this result can be achieved. For example, current ratio could be 
increased by increasing current assets or decreasing current liabilities in various 
combinations, each of which could in turn be manipulated by other firm factors (for 
example, current assets might be increased by over-stating accounts receivable). The 
heuristic used in focusing the search comes from the deviant expectations generated in 
the previous stage. Specifically, given the hypothesis "account i has been increased", 
the system computes which of the inputs in its equation must be increased holding all 
other components o f  the  equation constant in order to  make the hypothesis true. The 
analysis makes use of knowledge about the type of operator being applied. Evidence 
confirming the hypothesis is deemed t o  be found if there is an account which deviates 
from expectations in a direction that matches the hypothesis. For  example, if there 
existed a bond covenant that  the firm maintain a current ratio of greater than 2, then 
an unexpected increase in accounts receivable (determined in the expectation generation 
phase) would suggest that the bond covenant constraint had in fact played a role in 
inflating accounts receivable. In effect, this reasoning would constitute the explanation 
for the deviant expectation. 
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4. Eualuation and Summary 
TEE model described above has been demonstrated to  several auditors who were 
respoale in helping us design it. Their comments and critiques have been useful in 
help- us understand the limitations of the existing system and what must be done to 
alIevii&e them. a 
4.1,Ow.erly Data Driven Expectation Generation 
Our system's control of attention is driven by the base expectations specified by the 
user, Ebwever, we have now come to  realize that auditors' analyses are to  a large extent 
driven Qy the structure of the general ledger, beginning with current assets (accounts 
such aes cash) and ending with extraordinary items. More importantly, as this 
"dowm-ard scanningH proceeds, expectations about values of accounts yet to be 
reviewed become increasingly constrained. If the observed value does not fit with 
expt-x&&ions, a reinterpretation of the accounts reviewed thue far becomes necessary. 
Thk type  of progressive constraint posting does not take place in our model. 
For example, suppose that  the auditor observes inventory to be 'wi and that this is in 
line w%% the base expectation for this account. This might cause him to expect that 
p a p h k  will also be low (because of decreasing purchases). If payables are observed not 
to be  bw, the original interpretation needs to be altered. I t  cou!S ,d the case that there 
has  been a sharp increase in sales (causing a depletion in inventory) whereby re-orders 
have been lagging (and hence not yet reflected in payables). A different explanation 
might b e  that a technological change in the client's industry has rendered inventory 
obsaktxe, making it necessary to mark down its value. Similarly, other explanations can 
be g m r a t e d ,  some more plausible than others. Fundamentally, the more plausible of 
these explanations make use of "compiled knowledge", that is, typical patterns in 
relatiamships among firm factors observed by experienced auditors. 
Conmptually, the type of analysis described above makes use of knowledge about 
q~a;Iita;tr"9~e (directional) relationships between accounts and other firm factors. This 
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knowledge is in fact available in our model of the firm. However, our system only makes 
use of the model of the firm in trying to determine whether any incentives could be 
responsible for a deviant expectation. In contrast, it is now clear that the compiled 
knowledge about relationships among firm factors in this model needs to be used in 
determining whether an aczount is deviant in the first place. In order to implement this 
functionality, this knowledge will have to be gathered from further observat~ons of 
experienced auditors and represented as "compiled knowledgen links between nodes in 
the model of the firm. Such links been used to great advantage in the CADUCEUS 
system (Pople, 1982) as a way of focusing search. 
4.2. Over-emphasis on Incentives 
A second criticism, related to the one above, was that our model emphasized 
management motives too strongly. This effect becomes even more noticeable since the 
system ignores the relationships among firm factors described above. While incentives 
are an important determinant of inherent risk, we have now found that they are usually 
not considered by auditors unless the value of the constrained item in the incentive 
formula is close to  the boundary. That is, our default assumption that account balances 
have been influenced by incentives is not an accurate one. In fact, the opposite is often 
the case. Also, the second decision rule that shifting may occur when the value of the 
constrained item in the incentive formula is some distance from the bound is often 
applied inappropriately. This decision rule needs t o  be specialized. Also, auditors did 
not view all incentives as having equal potential impact on management's actions. For 
example, violating a bond covenant would be considered more serious than not 
achieving a budgeted goal. In summary, a hierarchy of incentives and accounts is 
necessary in order to  distinguish the important determinants of risk from the incidental. 
4.3. Extrapolation of Data to Year End 
Audit planning typically occurs prior to  the client's year end. Because of this, auditors 
do not have actual, unaudited year end balances with which to  test their expectations. 
The existing system uses a simple trend extrapolation to  compute year end balances. It 
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turns out  t ha t  the extrapolation is more complex than we had envisioned and can 
involve various factors. For  example, seasonality is an important component in 
estimating year end balances and varies according t o  irdustry. Our model does not 
make distinctions among industries. Further, some accounts such as extraordinary items 
are not even extrapolatable, 
4.4. Unintentional Errors 
An important addition t o  the current model that auditors deemed necessary was some 
mechanism for dealing with unintentional errors. Unintentional errors are errors that  
occur in a given account balance without any intentional act by management or 
employees t o  create the error, The lack of intention differentiates them from those 
potential errors dealt with by the incentive checking pu,-:-n of the existing model. 
Examples would include miscalculating inventory valu~. .  9r accidentally failing t o  
include all outstanding invoices in the accounts payable ;Idlance. Our system has no way 
t o  deal with such errors. In addition, our conceptual model does not deal with 
characteristics of the firm's management environment that  could effect all, or  at  least a 
broad range, of accounts (e.g. management's concerr for the internal control 
environment o r  high employee turnover in the accounting department). The auditors 
felt that  these two classes of factors that  influence the likelihood of an unintentional 
error in an account were extremely important in deters1i;ing the appropriate inherent 
risk for a given account. Further interaction with auditors will be needed to  determine 
how they use these factors t o  assess inherent risk and how their assessment of these 
factors is combined with the expectation and incentive data currently being processed 
by the model. 
4.5. Summary and Conclusion 
The model described here is a summary of a two year research effort, during which 
time we attempted t o  observe in as much detail a s  possible, the audit planning process 
with real cases. On the basis our evidence, we have come to  recognize the divergence in 
the normative literature and what actually occurs in practice. It is clear that auditors 
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do not consider it appropriate to generate numerical estimates of risk on an account by 
account basis, but reason about a client's financial statements using knowledge about 
changes in the industry and/or the client, management's motivations, prior track 
record, and so on. It has become increasingly apparent to us that if computer based 
. 
systems are t o  play a role in supporting auditors with this task, they must be capable of 
modeling this range of kGowledge. While our model is still inadequate in the ways 
described above, it is proving to be very useful in sharpening our understanding of the 
process of inherent risk assessment. In particular, giving auditors a real system to use 
(however limited) helped elicit data which would have been virtually impossible using 
interviewing and other data gathering techniques. We are continuing to  work with 
several of the auditors that helped us design the first version of the model. We hope to  
address the limitations of this model that we outlined above and report on progress with 
the new model in the near future. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87- 116 
References 
1. AICPA, AICPA P r d d n a l  Standards, Volume A: U.S. Auditing 
Standards (AICPA, 1%35b 
2.  Boritz, J.E., B.G. Graber and W.M. Lemon, An Experimental Study of 
Review of P r e l i m i n a ~  A d i t  Strategy by External Auditors, Proceedings of 
the Contemporary A c m d i n g  Research Conference, (August, 1986). 
3. Bouwman, M.J., FiamM Diagnosis: A Cognitive Model of the Process 
Involved, Ph.D. Dissert&n, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, 
Carnegie-Mellon UnivaSty, 1978. 
4. Cushing, B.E. and J.K h b b e c k e ,  Analytical Approaches to Audit Risk: A 
Survey and Analysis, Au&Yta'ng: Journal of Practice and Theory, (3:1, 1983), 
pp. 23 - 41. 
5. Dhar, V. and H.E. Ebopfe;, Rule-Based Versus dodel-Based Representations 
for Explaining and Generating Expert L,L --ior, Communications of the 
ACM, volume 30, number 6, June 1987. 
6 .  Gibbins, M. and F.M- Wolf, Auditor's Subjective Decision Environment -- 
The Case of a Normd fi-iternai Audit, Accounting Review, January 1982, 
pp. 105 - 124. 
7. Jiambalvo, J.J. and W. PF(~alIer, Decomposition and Assessments of Audit 
Risk, Auditing: Journal mJ Practice and Theory, (3:2, 1984). pp. 80 - 88. 
8. Libby, R., J.T. kctmm and J.J. Wlllngham, Process Susceptibility, 
Control Risk and Au&t Planning, Accounting Review, (April, 1985), pp. 212 
- 230. 
9. Peat Marwick Interna~ional, PMI Audit Manual - US, 1985. 
10. Peters, J., Lewis, B., and Dhar, V., Assessing Inherent Risk During Audit 
Planning: A Computathnal Model, under review for Accounting, 
Organizations and Sun'etg, 1987. 
11. Pople, Harry, E., Heuristic Methods for Imposing Structure on Ill-Structured 
Problems: The Structuring of Medical Diagnostics, Artificial Intelligence i n  
Medicine, Peter SzolovEts (!Led), Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1982, pp. 
119-184. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87- 116 
